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Keeton: Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect.

PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE MEANING OF DEFECT
PAGE KEETON*
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Most of the issues pertaining to the liability of manufacturers, and
other sellers in the marketing chain, for physical harm arising from
the dangerousness of products can be regarded as facets of two broad
problems-the meaning of defect and the kind of misconduct on the
part of users and others that will insulate a particular seller in the marketing chain from liability if the product is found to be defective.
There are other issues, such as whether a manufacturer should be excused because (a) either the injury resulted from a risk that was scientifically unknowable prior to the injury or (b) the state of the art
was, at the time of sale and prior to injury, such as to make it impossible or impractical to minimize a known or knowable risk. While
these other issues are important, the tremendous amount of uncertainty regarding the two basic problems as to the meaning of defect
and the effect of misconduct of others must be substantially reduced
before there can be effective administration of justice with reference
to claims in this area. Hardly any claims based on inherent risks in the
way products are designed can be settled at present with any confidence of what the outcome of litigation would have been, and trial
judges are faced with an impossible task of describing to the jury in
any sort of intelligible manner the scope of the seller's responsibility
in such cases.
It is respectfully submitted that a recent decision by the Supreme
Court of California not only failed to clarify the meaning of defect, but
rather added to the uncertainty. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,' a
1-ton bread truck with built-in bread racks was involved in an accident. The body of the van contained three aisles along which there
were welded runners extending from the front to the rear of the truck.
Each rack held 10 bread trays from top to bottom and five trays
deep. The trays slid forward into the cab or back through the rear
door to facilitate deliveries. While the plaintiff, the driver of the bread
* Dean, The University of Texas School of Law.
1. 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
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truck, was attempting to pass a pickup truck ahead of him, the driver
of the pickup made a sudden left turn, causing the pickup to collide
with the bread truck, forcing the latter off the road and into a ditch.
The evidence indicated that the loaded trays, driven forward by the
abrupt stop and impact, struck the plaintiff in the back and hurled
him through the windshield. The evidence further indicated that the
loaded trays would not have struck plaintiff but for the fact that an
aluminum safety hasp, located just behind the driver's seat and designed to hold the bread trays in place, broke.
At the trial, in Cronin, plaintiff's expert testified that the metal hasp
broke because it was made of metal that was extremely porous and
had a significantly lower tolerance to force than a nonflawed aluminum safety hasp would have had. The trial judge used instructions
current at the time in California requiring findings by the jury, among
other things, as a basis for recovery that the product (1) was defective,
(2) was being used for the purpose for which it was designed and intended to be used, and (3) the injuries and damages complained of
were proximately caused by the defect. It was defendant's contention that the charge was erroneous in failing to require a finding that
The court
the defect made the product "unreasonably dangerous."'
held that while the manufacturer is not an insurer against harm resulting from the use of products as intended, the plaintiff meets his burden
by proving there was a defect in manufacture or design of the product
While it would
and such defect was a proximate cause of injuries'
stated,
hereinafter
reasons
for
appear the result in the case is sound
the difficulty is that no content was given to the concept of defect and
this is vitally important when a plaintiff's theory is that a product, although fabricated and constructed as it was intended to be, subjected users or others to an inherent risk of harm that made the product defective. The court made the following observations:
The result of the limitation [the unreasonably dangerous requirement], however, has not been merely to prevent the seller
from becoming an insurer of his products with respect to all harm
generated by their use. Rather, it has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negligence. 4
We can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman5 formula2.
3.
4.
5.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Cronin v. B.E. Olson Corp., 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
Id.at 441.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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tion to the full range of products liability situations, including
those involving "design defects." A defect may emerge from the
mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the workman.(
It is submitted, contrary to what is asserted by the Supreme Court of
California, that lawyers in trying to settle cases, and trial judges, juries
and appellate courts in fulfilling their respective roles in the litigation
process will experience great difficulty until some content can be given
to the concept defective in those situations where it is alleged that the
product as designed and marketed was defective. The situation is productive of a vast amount of unnecessary litigation and an enormous
amount of unnecessarily prolonged and protracted litigation at a time
when every effort should be made to improve the administration of
justice. It is unfortunate perhaps that Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that as a basis for recovery it must be
found that the product was both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous," 7 when as a matter of fact the term "unreasonably dangerous" was meant only as a definition of defect. The phrase was not intended as setting forth two requirements but only one, the notion being
that the product was not defective for the purpose of shifting losses
due to physically harmful events unless it was "unreasonably dangerous." However, even the term "unreasonably dangerous" needs further elaboration if it is to serve any useful purpose as a guideline for
predicting results or as a standard to be used in the varying claims presented for disposition.
It was contended in behalf of a victim of Sabin oral vaccine that a
maker should be regarded as guaranteeing that the drug was fit and
safe for each and every user and not simply reasonably fit and reasonably safe for use by the public as a whole, but the court held that it
was unwilling to make such a far-reaching change in the law.' The
tortuous history of one of the lung cancer cases ended with the court
disallowing such a contention made on behalf of the victim.9 The
6. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). Notwithstanding this statement, the court did recognize the difficulty. The court remarked in footnote 16 as follows: "we recognize, of course, the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness standard. However, as Justice Traynor notes, 'there is now a
cluster of useful precedents to supersede the confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales and warranty law.'" See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.L. REV. 363, 373 (1965).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
9. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969). Other
opinions on that case were: 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968); 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.
1963); 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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three judges who dissented in that case observed that "[t]he one inescapable consideration is that a jury found as a fact that Mr. Edwin
Green, Sr. died of primary cancer of the lung caused from smoking
Lucky Strike cigarettes. . . . The decisive point is that when a jury so
found there simply remained no further strict liability factual issue
in the case."' 10 The issue regarding the necessity for a showing of a
defect was well stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon when it inquired in one of the MER/29 drug cases whether social justice requires that the price of drugs should include an amount sufficient to
create a fund to compensate those who suffer unanticipated harm
from the use of a beneficial product." There has been a virtual unanimity of opinion on the proposition that the product must be defective
as marketed in order to subject the manufacturer to liability. This is
not to say that it would be untenable to have a much broader responsibility imposing liability on makers for harm resulting from inherent
risks when the product was used as intended and there was no misconduct on the part of the user. The point is that if there is to be liability without respect to proof of a defect then courts would find it
necessary to develop two strict liability systems-one for defective
products and the other for good products. This is because a manufacturer would surely not be held liable for harm resulting from the
negligent use of a good hoe, axe, drug or the like unless one wishes to
shift virtually all accident costs to manufacturers. Seemingly the Supreme Court of California does not suggest that those victimized by
nondefective products would have a recovery, even when the product
was used appropriately. It simply rejects the notion that the product
must be unreasonably dangerous to be defective, and then substitutes
nothing in the place of that notion to give content to the term defective.
The change in the substantive law as regards the liability of makers
of products and other sellers in the marketing chain has been from fault
to defect. The plaintiff is no longer required to impugn the maker, but
he is required to impugn the product. Simply stated, the product
must be defective as marketed, and it may be defective as marketed
for one or the other of at least three reasons: (1) It may have been
fabricated or constructed defectively in the sense that the specific product was not at the time of sale by the maker or other seller in the
condition that the maker intended it to be; (2) it may have been im10. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166, 1167 (5th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
11. Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400 (Ore. 1966).
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properly designed; and (3) purchasers and those who are likely to use
the product may have been misinformed or inadequately informed, either about the risks and dangers involved in the use of the product
or how to avoid or minimize the harmful consequences from such
risks. 2 In so stating, it must be obvious that while different categories
of defects are recognized, there has been no resolution of the ultimate
question as to the meaning of defect.
A determination of the proper scope for strict liability-including the
questions as to the necessity for a showing of a defect and then the
meaning of a defect-should begin with a brief survey of the reasons
commonly given for strict liability. It has often been urged as a justification for strict liability that defects in products are more often than
not attributable to fault, but it is difficult to prove. Therefore, it is
said that a more efficient and just system would eliminate the necessity for proof of fault.'" This argument assumes the necessity for a
showing of a defect.
The reduction of the incidence of harm resulting from unsafe products is often stated to be a reason for the imposition of strict liability." It would appear that the desire to reduce accidents justifies
shifting losses to a maker only if he could have eliminated a danger
that ought not to have existed. Consequently, liability should not be
extended to makers for harm resulting from unavoidable injurious
effects of highly desirable products, such as good penicillin, good cigarettes, or good whiskey. In addition, it is doubtful if strict liability
does induce greater care than does negligence liability. Moreover, if
strict liability does induce greater care, it can be argued that it will
also tend to inhibit the development of new products. Thus, the importance of the development of new products may be a factor to be
considered in establishing the limits of strict liability. This argues for
the proposition that strict liability should not extend to nondefective
products.
12. See Keeton, Products Liability,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES,

50 F.R.D. 319, 338 (1970).

13. See Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory Fault and Unusual
Uses, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
THE UNITED STATES,

50 F.R.D. 319, 321 (1970).

14. See Escola v. coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J.); Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Keeton,
Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1329, 1333 (1966); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the

Consumer), 69

YALE

L. REV. 1099, 1119 (1960).
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It is argued in the third place that it is the frustration of consumer
expectations that should constitute the basis for recovery.1" If frustration of consumer expectations as to the nature and quality of a
product were the only basis for shifting losses without fault, recovery
would be limited to those harmed in damaging events attributable
to risks of which consumers were unaware.
A fourth and perhaps the major reason ordinarily given for strict
liability in this area is that those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise can serve effectively as risk distributors by accepting responsibility for accident losses attributable to the dangerousness of products as a cost of doing busness.16 If this be accepted as the dominant
reason, liability could conceivably be expanded to include harm from
damaging events resulting from inherently dangerous characteristics
of good products. But there are many other techniques for dealing
with accident losses, and even if the notion of enterprise liability is
accepted, users are often enterprisers, and obviously some of the risks
of damaging events should be allocated to such enterprisers in preference to enterprisers who made the products that were being used.
Employees who are injured in the course of their employment as a result of damaging events arising out of that employment have an assured recovery, albeit inadequate, and any compensation system as to
product liability would take this into account. Indeed, a product
liability scheme for dealing with accident losses occurring in the course
of the use of industrial and commercial products need not logically
be the same as that for products intended for use by the consuming
17
public at large.
MEANING OF DEFECT

Two theories of recovery and three distinct tests of defect have been
employed by the courts in delineating the ambit of responsibility of a
manufacturer in the absence of proof of negligence. The theories have,
15. See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TExAs L. REV.

398, 399 (1970). The position was taken in that article that while the obviousness of
a danger is a highly relevant factor, it ought not necessarily to be conclusive in all
situations. A great deal depends upon the sophistication of those who are intended to
be users of a product.
16. The leading cases have given this as a primary reason. Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).

17. See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks,

64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1966).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss1/3

6

Keeton: Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:30

of course, been those of implied warranty and strict liability in tort.18
Often, appellate courts have approved and authorized charges on
both theories. Indeed a charge to the jury in a product liability case
is often a conglomerate of three theories-negligence, implied warranty and strict liability in tort. Such charges are often unintelligible
even to a sophisticated lawyer unless he has specialized on this subject,
and certainly they are so to a lay jury. Our supreme courts should
arrive at a theory of recovery to the exclusion of all others. Trial
judges cannot under the present state of the law be criticized for being unable to submit a product liability case to a jury in a satisfactory
manner. This situation emphasizes the fact that lack of efficiency in
the administration of justice is often due to the complexities and ambiguities of the substantive law rather than to either court organization
or court procedures. The fact that litigants, especially plaintiffs, want
as a matter of tactics to employ all three theories is not at all decisive.
Two of the three tests Used by the courts to identify a defect can be
attributed largely to the fact that many courts used warranty theories
initially in arriving at strict liability. The first of the three tests follows.
A product is defective if it is not reasonably fit for its intended
(ordinary) (or reasonably foreseeable) purposes. 9 This unfitness test
was without doubt devised primarily as a basis for deciding when purchasers could recover from sellers for intangible financial and commercial losses resulting from the fact that the purchasers' expectations as
to what the product would do were frustrated. It is useful and practical in dealing with claims for damages based on a lack of efficacy of
the product to meet the needs of those who are purchasers. In that
type of case it is not enough to show in the absence of an express
18.

Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969)

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962)

(warranty);

(discussing both

theories); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305 (Ill. 1970); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (warranty); Mendel v. Pittsburg
Plate Glass Co., 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (discussing both theories); McKisson v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Sup. 1967) (tort).

19. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946) (cleaning fluid
not intended for use in the eye); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 198 N.E.2d
681 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964) (inflammable hair spray used on dress); Shaw v. Calgon, Inc.,
114 A.2d 278 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1955) (used dishwasher product for venetian blinds);
Ringstad v. Magnin & Co., 239 P.2d. 848 (Wash. 1952) (inflammable dress worn

near stove). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2). The code provision is as
follows: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . (c) are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 1 (1973).
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warranty that the product was not as good as it was expected to be.
It must frustrate the purchaser's purpose, and his purpose must have
been either a purpose for which the product was designed or intended,
unless the seller was made aware of the buyer's special purpose and
the latter was relying on the seller. It was never intended to be a test
for ascertaining when a maker would be liable for damages incurred
by those who were physically harmed. This is apparent from the
fact that the Uniform Commercial Code provides for recovery of damages for physical harm as consequential damages from a breach of
warranty and only then if that damage proximately results from the
breach of warranty.2" This means at the very least that physical harm
from such unfitness must be reasonably foreseeable. For reasons that
will be stated hereafter this is a circuitous route to saying that the
product is unreasonably dangerous. A characteristic of a product
that makes it both unfit and dangerous is another way of saying that it
is unreasonably dangerous as that term is defined hereafter.
The second test commonly used is one that is set forth in one of the
commentaries to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
This was written in the early stages of the development of strict liability theories and at a time when the courts were relying largely on
concepts utilized in arriving at liability on a warranty theory. Indeed
the black letter of the Restatement section limited strict liability to
consumers, and the idea was that harm must flow from a characteristic that frustrated consumer expectations. While the term "unreasonably dangerous" was employed in the black letter, it was defined in the
commentary as being dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be reasonably contemplated by intended (and reasonably foreseeable)
purchasers. This does speak to the issue-the dangerousness of the
product. But it is a nebulous test-a vague and a very imprecise
one-because the ordinary consumer cannot be said to have expectations as to safety regarding many features of the complexly made products that are purchased, such as the risk of fire from the way gasoline
tanks are designed and installed in cars or the magnitude of the risks
of cars overturning and the like.
The third and final test which I suggest to be the appropriate one is
as follows: A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as
20. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715.
This was
21. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
the test that was used in the charge to the jury in C.A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin
Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
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marketed. It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would
conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as
it is proved to be at the time of trial outweighed the benefits of the
way the product was so designed and marketed. 2 Under the heading
of benefits one would include anything that gives utility of some kind
to the product; one would also include the infeasibility and additional
cost of making a safer product. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has said, "[D]emanding that the defect render the product unreasonably dangerous reflects a realization that many products have
both utility and danger." 23
An excellent illustration of this is presented in Metal Window Products Co. v. Magnusen.2 4 In that case, judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the trial court on both negligence and strict liability theories.
The product was a sliding glass door installed in an apartment. The
door constituted the rear entrance to the apartment and was the
same type used in other apartments of the building. Plaintiff attended
a cookout at the apartment. Plaintiff had gone back and forth through
the door when it was open several times but the last time she started
through, the door had been closed and she struck it. It was urged that
the door was defective as designed and marketed because of the absence
of any decals or warnings that would put a person on notice when the
door was closed. The court held that the door was not unreasonably
dangerous as a matter of law and three factors were stressed-the utility
of transparency, the obviousness of the danger, and the ease with which
users could supply decals to guard against the obvious risk involved.
The desire for a view, the gracious and spacious concept and the
feeling that transparency gives to being outdoors and yet indoors are
esthetic considerations that cause people to want glass doors, even with
the risk that is inherent in them.2 5 I would hope that decisions of this
nature will produce instructions to the jury asking the jury to make
this kind of evaluation of products, and that trials are simplified by
way of eliminating negligence theories and other tests such as those
mentioned above.
In Cronin, the hasp or locking device was not as suitable for its pur22. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965); Keeton, Products Liability-

Inadequacy of Information, 48 T xAs L. Rav. 398, 403 (1970).
23. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968).
24. 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ).
25. Id. at 358.
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pose as it was intended to be, and furthermore it was not as safe as it
would have been had it been constructed and fabricated as intended.
Danger was reasonably foreseeable, and there was no redeeming feature-no beneficial purpose to be served by having metal that was
porous, containing holes, pits and voids. Therefore, the product was
unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law and this would be true of
virtually any fabrication or construction defect. But if defect is to be
a requirement, it is submitted that there is no way to avoid a risk-benefit analysis in passing upon designs. If a court wishes to depart from
the requirement of a defect-and as stated heretofore, some may think
that this should be done-then it is submitted that a maker could be
held liable for harm resulting to anyone in any case even in the absence of a defect if, but only if, proper care was exercised in the use
of the product and no one else can be found who could be regarded as
culpably responsible for the damaging event. That would be a rather
far-reaching step, but it would be a method for riskspreading when no
one can be found who was culpably responsible.
It will be noted that the test suggested for a defect makes no allowance for the fact that the maker was excusably ignorant of the risk
that caused the product to be defective. Whether or not the scientific
unknowability of the risk should be a roadblock to recovery is another
question. If it is, then as the Supreme Court of California suggests,
strict liability as to design defects is virtually a myth. This is not to
say that negligence should be a prerequisite to recovery when the claim
is based on the ground that the product was improperly designed. It is
only to say that the courts must face the issue squarely and decide
whether or not negligence is or is not to be a prerequisite to recovery.
As for products intended for industrial and commercial use, fault
might well be a prerequisite to recovery, especially in the light of two
other liability-without-fault schemes applicable to users of those products-the workmen's compensation system for the protection of employees and the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine applicable in
most jurisdictions that protects bystanders in many situations.
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